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Abstract
We propose an ensemble technique for converting any classifier into a computa-
tionally secure classifier. We define a simpler security problem for random binary
classifiers and prove a reduction from this model to the security of the overall
ensemble classifier. We provide experimental evidence of the security of our ran-
dom binary classifiers, as well as empirical results of the adversarial accuracy of
the overall ensemble to black-box attacks. Our construction crucially leverages
hidden randomness in the multiclass-to-binary reduction.
1 Introduction
Current machine learning models are vulnerable at test time to adversarial examples, which are data
points that have been imperceptibly modified from legitimate data points but are misclassified with
high confidence. This problem has attracted significant researcher interest [SZS+13][GSS15] in
both explaining their existence and defending against an adversary who tries to compute them. Previ-
ous work has attempted to train models to be explicitly robust to attacks by incorporating robustness
into the optimization problem [MMS+17][SRBB18], by input transformations and discretization to
reduce model linearity [Jac18], or by injecting randomness at inference time [XWZ+17]. However
these defenses have all been subsequently broken by changing the attack model slightly in terms of
allowable perturbations [SC17] or by using more sophisticated attacks [ACW18].
Recent explanations suggest that the existence of adversarial examples is actually inevitable in high-
dimensional spaces. [GMF+18][FGCC19] show that these examples exist for any linear classifier
with nonzero error rate under additive Gaussian noise. This vulnerability is a simple geometrical fact
when the dimension d is large: because most of the mass of a Gaussian distribution is concentrated
near the shell, the distance to the closest misclassified example is a factor d1/2 closer than the
distance to the shell. [IST+19] show that adversarial perturbations can actually be robust features
for generalization, and thus their adversarial nature is just a misalignment with our natural human
notions of robustness.
In light of the evidence for the inevitability of adversarial perturbations, one goal we can still hope
to achieve is a computational separation between their existence and the computational complex-
ity of computing them. We propose a cryptographic technique which uses hidden random binary
codewords to prevent the adversary from easily computing these perturbations. Any instantiation of
the random binary codewords produces an accurate classifier with high probability, so there is no
danger of security through obscurity, because the model owner can sample his own fresh random
bits. Furthermore, the space of all possible binary codewords is exponential in the number of output
classes, so the adversary cannot simply try all of them.
A major show-stopper with black-box models which rely on hidden information is the phenomenon
of transferability [PMG16a], where an adversarial perturbation computed for one model has a high
chance of causing an independently trained model to simultaneously fail. The first model is called
the substitute model, and the second model is the black-box oracle model. [PMG+16b] show that,
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even if the adversary is only given black-box oracle access to predicted labels, existing machine
learning models are vulnerable to transfer learning attacks executed by training substitute models.
The transfer success rate is the probability that an adversarial example computed for the substitute
model is also misclassified by the black-box oracle.
Thus, in order to hide the randomness in a single classifier, we must not allow the adversary to di-
rectly query it. We achieve this by a special ensemble scheme such that the adversary learns only the
output of the overall ensemble without learning any of the intermediate representations. Previous en-
semble techniques for increasing adversarial robustness only subsample or augment the training data
within each class [TKP+17], whereas our ensemble samples random splits of the labels themselves
within the overall multiclass classification setup. This means that the underlying classification prob-
lem is unknown to the adversary, and we argue that this randomness decreases the transfer success
rate.
2 Preliminaries
Let X ⊂ Rd be the feature space, and let Y = {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of classes. The learning
problem is to construct a multiclass classifier that is allowed to abstain from making a prediction by
returning the symbolω. We assume all classifier training is conducted using a fixedmachine learning
algorithm ML which is public knowledge. ML takes as input a set of binary-labeled data points
{(xi, zi)}
n
i=1, where each xi ∈ X and zi ∈ {±1}, and outputs a binary classifier f : X → {±1}.
Furthermore, we assume that ML({(xi, zi)})
n
i=1 = −ML({(xi,−zi)})
n
i=1, which just means that
the labels −1 and +1 have no intrinsic meaning. Lastly, we fix some space P ⊂ X to be the set of
allowable adversarial perturbations, for example {ρ ∈ X | ‖ρ‖∞ < c}.
2.a Threat model
We consider the setting of a server hosting a fixed classifier F : X → {1, . . . , N, ω} and users who
interact with the server by presenting a query q ∈ X to the server and receiving the output labelF (q).
We call F a black-box classifier, because the user does not see any of the intermediate computation
values of F (q). Two types of users access the server: honest users who present queries drawn
from a natural data distribution, and adversarial users who present adversarial examples designed to
intentionally cause a misclassification. The desired property is to serve the honest users the true label
while simultaneously preventing the adversarial users from causing a misclassification; the latter is
accomplished by either continuing to return the true label on adversarial examples or by returning
the abstain label ω.
In order for this distinction to be well-defined, we need to separate natural misclassified examples
from adversarial examples. We achieve this by fixing in advance a data point x which is correctly
classified by F (x) and requiring the adversary to compute a perturbation ρ ∈ P for this specific x
such that F (x+ρ) 6∈ {F (x), ω}. We think of x as a parameter of the attack, for example the natural
image of the face of an attacker who wishes to masquerade as someone else. The classifier F is
secure if for all x, the adversary cannot find a ρ satisfying this.
We formalize this attack problem by the notion of a security challenge. The adversary is given all the
information about F except for any internal randomness used to initialize F . The adversary is then
given the challenge point (x, y) with F (x) = y being the correct classification, and the adversary
successfully solves the security challenge if he finds a ρ such that F (x + ρ) 6∈ {ω, F (x)} with
non-negligible probability. The solution to the security challenge is a successful attack.
The separation between existence of a solution and feasibility of finding it is given by resource
constraints on the adversary, most commonly in the form of runtime. We say that a security challenge
is hard if there does not exist an algorithm for finding a solution within these resource constraints.
In addition to runtime, we also consider the constraint of how many times the adversary is allowed
to interact with the classifier.
We make a distinction between these query points (denoted by q) and the challenge point (denoted by
x), both of which are feature vectors in X . Query points are arbitrarily chosen by the adversary for
the purpose of learning more about the black-box F , and there is no notion of correctness for F (q).
The ability to obtain labels for arbitrary query points enables the adversary to mount more powerful
black-box attacks, for example the substitute model training methods described by [PMG+16b].
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This larger space of possible attacks is realistic but also makes direct empirical security analysis
difficult. Cryptographic proofs of security provide an alternative to direct analysis.
2.b Security proofs in cryptography
Instead of directly trying to prove the security of F , we define a simpler system f that is easier to
empirically test and reason about. We then prove a reduction from the security challenge of F to the
security challenge of f , which shows that F is at least as hard to attack as f . We define a security
assumption that characterizes the hardness of attacking f . This security assumption cannot be math-
ematically proven to be true, but nonetheless defining the right assumption makes the reduction is
useful, because this assumption can be easier to empirically study. If the security assumption for the
hardness of f is true, then F is secure.
The security assumption we define is the hardness of attacking a new type of randomized classifier
without any query access to it. We give two reasons why this assumption is the right one to make.
Firstly, the scope of attacks to analyze is greatly reduced when the attacker has no access to the
classifier. The adversary can essentially only mount transfer learning attacks by training models
on the public dataset. Secondly, we only require the probability of success of the adversary to be
bounded below 1 by a constant, and the overall security of the ensemble can be boosted from this
bound. We next describe this assumption detail.
2.c Random binary classifiers
In a multiclass classification problem with labels 1, . . . , N , suppose we have a binary classifier
f : X → {±1} for two particular classes y and t, where class y is mapped to +1 and class t is
mapped to −1. An adversary is given a data point (x, y) with f(x) = +1, and the adversary wishes
to attack this binary classifier by computing a perturbation ρ such that f(x+ ρ) = −1. However, at
training time f was not trained on just data points with original labels y or t, but with all remaining
N − 2 classes also having been randomly remapped to ±1 with equal probability. In other words,
for each class k 6∈ {y, t}, we sample a Rademacher random variable zk ∼ {±1} and assign every
data point of original label k to the new binary label zk. This random assignment does not change
the original y-vs-t classification task when all query data points are only of original class y or t. The
resulting f corresponding to training with the random binary labels z ∼ {±1}N is a random binary
classifier:
Definition 1 (Random binary classifier). Let D be a distribution over {±1}N . The random binary
classifier over D is the distribution of f over z ∼ D where each training data point xi is relabeled
to ±1 by zyi :
fz := ML
({
(xi, zyi)
}n
i=1
)
.
The security challenge for the random binary classifier is to compute a perturbation that changes its
output with high probability over the sampling of z.
Definition 2 (Security challenge for random binary classifier). Let fz := ML{(xi, zyi)}
n
i=1. Let
z ∼ {±1}N be a Rademacher random vector, and let Dyt be the distribution of z conditioned on
zy = +1, zt = −1. The security challenge for a challenge data point (x, y), failure rate δ > 0, and
target label t 6= y is to compute a perturbation ρ ∈ P which changes the output of fz(x) with failure
rate no greater than δ:
Pr
z∼Dyt
[fz(x+ ρ) 6= fz(x)] > 1− δ.
In particular, the adversary has no ability to obtain labels for query points from the random binary
classifier.
Note that the adversary has knowledge of two of the bits of z, corresponding to the original label
y and some target label t 6= y. Our security assumption is that for any ρ ∈ P , there is enough
randomness in the remainingN − 2 data classes such that the failure rate is non-negligible.
Assumption 1 (Security assumption). Given an instance of the security challenge for a random
binary classifier, for any ρ ∈ P , for all c > 0, there exists a constantN0 > 0 such that
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Pr
z∼Dyt
[
fz(x+ ρ) 6= f(x)
]
≤ 1− 1/N c
wheneverN ≥ N0.
Note that this implicitly assumesP does not contain any non-adversarial perturbations, such as those
of the form x′−xwhere x′ is a legitimate image of class t. In Section 4.a, we experimentally justify
this assumption by estimating the transfer success probability for all pairs of classes (y, t) in the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets using the standard ℓ∞-ball for P .
2.d Main construction
Recall that our goal is to construct a multiclass classifier F : X −→ {1, 2, . . . , N, ω} which is
allowed to abstain from making a prediction (as represented by the output ω), and an adversarial
perturbation ρ is only considered a successful attack if F (x+ ρ) 6∈ {F (x), ω}.
Our ensemble construction is the error-correcting code approach for multiclass-to-binary reduction
[DB94], except with completely random codes for security purposes.
Construction 1 (Random ensemble classifier). Given a multiclass classification problemwith labels
Y = {1, . . . , N}, a codelengthM , and a threshold parameter r ∈ (0, 1/3):
• Sample random matrix Z ∈ {±1}N×M , where each Zij ∼ {±1} independently and with
equal probability
• For j = 1, . . . ,M , construct the binary classifier fj = ML
(
{(xi, Zyij)}
n
i=1
)
Given a query data point x, compute output F (x) by:
• Compute the predicted codeword vector C(x) := (f1(x), . . . , fM (x))
• Compute (d∗, y∗) = min
y
‖Zy − C(x)‖H , where y
∗ is the index and d∗ is the Hamming
distance to Zy∗
• If d∗ < Mr, then output y∗, else output ω
In this construction, the codeword Zy ∈ {±1}
M acts as the identity of class y, and thus the clas-
sification of a data point x is the class codeword which is closest to its predicted codeword C(x).
We should think of the free parameters as M = Ω(poly(N)) and r = O(1/N). M needs to be
sufficiently large in order for the random ensemble classifier to be accurate on natural examples, and
r needs to be sufficiently small for security purposes.
We give some intuition for why this construction has desirable security properties. In order for an
adversary to change the overall output of some test point (x, y), he needs to change the output of
sufficiently many binary classifiers fj so that C(x + ρ) is close to some codeword Zt, t 6= y. But
the Hamming distance between Zy and Zt is M/2 on expectation, and x, x + ρ must be within
distance Mr to Zy, Zt respectively. Since each fi is constructed independently at random, the
overall probability of success is exponentially decreasing in the probability of successfully changing
the output of an individual classifier.
We proceed to define the security challenge for this construction. We will use the shorthand notation
Z ∼ {±1}N×M to denote the distribution of Z ∈ {±1}N×M where each entry is independently
sampled from {±1} with equal probability.
Definition 3 (Security challenge for random ensemble). Let FZ(·) be the ensemble classifier con-
structed with random hidden code matrix Z as defined in Construction 1. The security challenge for
a challenge data point (x, y) and accuracy ε ∈ (0, 1) is a two-round protocol:
1. Provide Q nonadaptive queries to FZ(·) and receive answer labels, denoted by
{(qk, ak)}
Q
k=1. The queries cannot depend on Z but can depend on anything else, including
the original training data set and the construction of F .
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2. Return a perturbation ρ ∈ P by some function of the query answers ρ = φ({ak}
Q
k=1) such
that ρ satisfies
Pr
Z∼{±1}N×M
[
FZ(x+ ρ) 6∈ {FZ(x), ω}
]
> ε,
An algorithm for solving the security challenge is determined by its query set {qk}
Q
k=1 and the
function φ for computing the final perturbation from the query answers.
For example, one possible attack captured by this model is substitute DNN training with a one
epoch of data augmentation, which is a single epoch version of the black-box attack described by
[PMG+16b]. The adversary obtains a pre-labeled dataset of arbitrary size (which could be the
original training data set) and trains an initial substitute DNN on this dataset. The adversary then
iteratively refines this initial DNN through substitute training epochs by using Jacobian data augmen-
tation to construct new synthetic data points. These synthetic points are labeled using the black-box
classifier and added to the labeled dataset using the classifier’s output as the label.
The synthetic data points are the queries q1, . . . , qQ, and thus our proof shows that a single epoch of
data augmentation is not sufficient to construct a successful attack (assuming the security assumption
is true). The actual implementation of this attack in [PFC+16] uses a constant number of substitute
training epochs, and our proof does not apply directly to this implementation, because the second
round of queries can depend on the answers in the first round. Nonetheless, we show empirically
in Section 4.b that our construction is still secure against this attack involving a constant number of
rounds of queries.
3 Security analysis
The main theoretical result is a reduction from solving the random classifier challenge to solving the
random ensemble challenge. In our reduction, we make the simplifying assumption that the space
of allowable perturbations P is the same in both security challenges. This allows us to get away
with not explicitly defining which perturbations are adversarial and which are legitimate, because a
perturbationwhich makes x+ρ a legitimate image of the class twould solve both security challenges
simultaneously. We also assume without loss of generality that r is chosen such that Mr ∈ Z,
because Hamming distance is an integer.
Theorem 4. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can solve the security challenge for the
random ensemble with any threshold r ∈ (0, 1/3) such that Mr ∈ Z using Q queries and with
accuracy ε ∈ (0, 1). Then there is an algorithm that can compute a perturbation ρ which solves the
security challenge for a random binary classifier with failure rate
δ < 2
(
r +
√
log(1/ε)
2M
)
.
The algorithm succeeds in computing this perturbation with probability (over Z) at least
1− 4NQ
√
M
2π
·
1− r
r
·
(
3
25/3
)M
.
The theorem shows that if such an algorithm A exists, r = O(1/N), and M = Ω(poly(N)), then
the failure rate decreases asO(1/N c) for some constant c, which contradicts the security assumption
(Assumption 1). Conversely, if the security assumption is true, then an adversary cannot solve the
security challenge for the random ensemble with O(poly(N)) nonadaptive queries to the ensemble
classifier.
We give a brief proof sketch here, deferring the full proof to Section A. Given a single random
classifier fz , we can simulate the entire ensemble classifier FZ by constructing the remainingM −1
random classifiers using the public data set and ML. However, we cannot apply A to FZ directly,
because in Definition 2 there is no query access to fz . Thus we first show in Lemma A.1 that we
can simulate the output of the entire ensemble using onlyM − 1 classifiers with high probability.
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Then, applying the algorithmA the ensemble ofM − 1 classifiers produces an attack perturbation ρ
which also applies to the entire ensemble ofM classifiers. Now we want to compute the probability
of the output of each individual classifier in the ensemble being changed, but the Q queries could
potentially leak information about some column Zj . We use Lemma A.1 for each column j to show
that this is not the case; i.e. that the query answers are completely determined by the remaining
M − 1 columns with high probability and thus independent of column j itself. Then we show in
Lemma A.2 that an overall success probability of ε gives an upper bound on δ for each individual
classifier.
4 Empirical results
We provide empirical analysis on both the security assumption (Assumption 1) and the adversarial
test accuracy for the MNIST [LCB98] and CIFAR-10 [Kri09] datasets. We use code from the
CleverHans adversarial examples library [PFC+16] and from the MadryLab CIFAR10 adversarial
examples challenge [Ma¸d17] for the base classifier architecture, training, and attacks. The only
modification to the base classifier architecture was to change the output layer from dimension 10 to
dimension 2 for a binary output; no further architecture tuning was performed to optimize natural
accuracy.
4.a Analysis of random binary classifiers
First, we empirically estimate the transfer success rate for all pairs of classes. We train a sample
size of 30 random binary classifiers and then compute an adversarial perturbation for each test data
point and each target class. The perturbation is computed by using a pre-trained standard model for
the respective dataset with all N output dimensions. We then compute whether each random binary
classifier makes a different prediction on the original test data point versus the perturbed test data
point. Finally, for each pair (y, t), we empirically estimate the probability of the output of fz(·)
being changed conditioned on zy 6= zt and plot this. The goal of this analysis is to show that this
probability is bounded below 1 by a constant.
4.a.1 MNIST
We use the Fast Gradient Sign Method applied to a simple convolutional neural network which
achieves 99.3% test accuracy and 61.6% black-box adversarial test accuracy as the substitute model,
as implemented in CleverHans [PFC+16]. The perturbation space is an ℓ∞ ball with radius ε (note
that this ε is standard notation for the step size of the attack in the literature; we no longer refer to ε
in the main theorem). The parameter setting ε = 0.3 is chosen by [PMG+16b] as being optimal in
the sense that increasing ε does not increase the attacker’s power. We also show results for ε = 1 to
illustrate the robustness of our assumption.
Figure 1 shows the success probabilities over all pairs of classes (y, t) averaged over all of the
test data points. The vertical axis corresponds to the original label y, while the horizontal axis
corresponds to the target label t. The color scheme is the viridis palette, which scales uniformly
from 0 (black) to 1 (yellow). The warmest coordinate (1, 7) for ε = 0.3 corresponds to a probability
of 0.14.
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
FGSM with ε=0.3
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
FGSM with ε=1
Figure 1: Success probabilities for targeted attacks on MNIST random binary classifiers
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Next we plot the success probabilities of each individual test data point for the highest misclassified
pairs. Recall that our total sample size of random binary classifiers is 30, but Prz[zy 6= zt] = 1/2,
so the expected sample size for each data point and each pair (y, t) is 15 samples. Figure 2 shows the
distribution for the two highest probabilites in the ε = 0.3 plot. We can see that even the worst-case
test data points have probabilities bounded far away from 1.
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Figure 2: Distribution of success probabilities for individual MNIST test data points, ε = 0.3
4.a.2 CIFAR10
We use Projected Gradient Descent on the cross-entropy loss with an ℓ∞ norm bound of ε = 8, as
implemented in theMadryLab CIFAR10 Adversarial Examples Challenge [Ma¸d17]. The pre-trained
substitute is a w28-10 wide residual network [ZK16], and the random binary classifiers are the same
ResNet architecture but with two output dimensions instead of ten. Figure 3 shows the empirical
success probabilities over the CIFAR-10 data set for all pairs of classes.
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PGD with ε=8
Figure 3: Success probabilities for targeted attacks on CIFAR-10 random binary classifiers
We see that attacks with target label y = 6 (frog) have particularly high success rate on random
binary classifiers when the source class is another animal. However for the majority of pairs, the
security assumption is valid. We plot in Figure 4 the individual test data point distributions for the
(y, t) pairs (4, 5) and (5, 6). We see that our security assumption actually fails when transforming
cats, deer, and dogs into frogs, but the failure of the security assumption for these cases is at least
interpretable in the sense that the easily confused classes are also close to each other by human
perception.
4.b Analysis of black-box adversarial accuracy
Next, we empirically analyze the robustness of our random ensemble construction to black-box
transfer learning attacks. We use the CleverHans attack library [PFC+16] as a standard benchmark.
The attack algorithm trains a two-layer fully connected substitute model iteratively augmenting its
training data set via queries to the random ensemble scheme and then uses the Fast Gradient Sign
Method attack on the substitute model.
Because the attack library is not designed for querying classifier which abstains, we perform sub-
stitute model training with a non-abstaining random ensemble (i.e. r = 1/2). We consider the
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Figure 4: Distribution of success probabilities for individual CIFAR10 test data points
threshold r at the end when analyzing the final true and adversarial test accuracies. In order to incor-
porate the abstain label, we use the following definitions of accuracy for our experiments. The true
test accuracy requires the classifier to make the correct, non-abstaining prediction. However when
computing adversarial accuracy, we also consider it a success if the classifier outputs ω.
Definition 5 (True and adversarial test accuracy). Given a multiclass classifier F : X →
{1, 2, · · · , N, ω}which is allowed to abstain from making a prediction (as represented by the output
ω), the relevant accuracy benchmarks are
True accuracy := E
(x,y)
[
1[F (x) = y]
]
Adversarial accuracy := E
(x̂,y)
[
1[F (x̂) ∈ {y, ω}]
]
,
where x is the original data point and x̂ is an adversarial perturbation of x.
All random binary classifiers used in these experiments are the same architecture as the random
binary classifiers in Section 4.a. Figure 5 shows that the ensemble enjoys good adversarial accuracy
in the low-r regime, although there is a tradeoff with the true test accuracy.
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Figure 5: Accuracy versus Hamming distance ratio (r)
5 Conclusion
We proposed a novel approach to provable robustness at test time in the adversarial setting. We
formalized a smaller attack problem which is easier to study and which we conjecture to be hard.
We also show that our overall ensemble construction enjoys high adversarial accuracy against black-
box attacks with standard measures of perturbation size while being completely agnostic of these
parameters. Our formal proof framework introduces some techniques in analysis of cryptographic
constructions to the adversarial learning problem, and we hope it can lead to more principled empir-
ical and theoretical work in this area.
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A Proofs
Lemma A.1. Fix any query point q and threshold r < 1/3 such that Mr ∈ Z. Given a random
ensemble function FZ : X → {1, . . . , N} with M independently and identically generated random
classifiers and threshold r < 1/3, fix some j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and let FZ−j denote the modified
ensemble which ignores the jth random classifier and takes the vote over only the remainingM − 1
classifiers. Then
Pr
Z−j∼{±1}N×(M−1)
[
FZ(q) 6= FZ−j (q)
]
≤ 4N
√
1− r
2πMr
(
3
25/3
)M
,
where the probability is taken only over the matrix Z−j and is independent of the column Zj .
The lemma shows that for any j, with high probability over Z−j the query answer FZ(q) is indepen-
dent of Zj , so that no information is revealed by the queries about column j. In the following proofs
we will use the shorthand fj := fZj , i.e. the random classifier constructed from the jth column of
Z .
Proof. The only way the additional vote of fj(q) can influence the vote of FZ−j (q) is if the predicted
codeword of lengthM−1 is on the decision boundary between some class i and the abstaining space
corresponding to ω. In the boolean hypercube {±1}M−1, the number of points that are at a distance
of exactly k to any fixed point is
(
M−1
k
)
. Because we want our probability bound to hold true
regardless of the value of fj , we have to consider the possibility of fj(q) influencing the points on
either side of the decision boundary. To account for this, we multiply the number by 2. Then over all
N classes, the number of possible points on the decision boundary is at most 2N
(
M−1
Mr
)
by a union
bound.
Recall that we assumed the machine learning oracle is symmetric; that is, ML{(xi, yi)
n
i=1} =
−ML{(xi,−yi)
n
i=1}. Thus given any query data point q, Prz [fz(q) = 1] = 1/2 when z ∼ {±1}
M
uniformly, because the probabilities of sampling z and−z are identical. Then over sampling of Z−j ,
the predicted codeword vector has independently distributed Rademacher entries, which means the
probability mass on any point in {±1}M−1 is 1/2M−1. Thus the probability of q being on the
decision boundary is at most
2N
2M−1
(
M − 1
Mr
)
=
4N(1− r)
2M
(
M
Mr
)
. (1)
We now apply the binomial coefficient upper bound from [MS78], stated in Appendix B.1, to obtain
(
M
Mr
)
≤
1√
2πMr(1− r)
2MH2(r),
where H2(r) = −r log2 r − (1 − r) log2(1 − r) is the negative entropy function. Note that H2(r)
is monotonically increasing in r ∈ (0, 1/2) and reaches log2 at r = 1/2, so when r < 1/3 then
H2(r) ≤ log2
3
22/3
≈ 0.6365. Thus the probability in (1) can be bounded by
4N(1− r)
2M
1√
2πMr(1− r)
2MH2(r) ≤ 4N
√
1− r
2πMr
(
3
25/3
)M
.
Since 3
25/3
≈ 0.945, this gives an exponentially decaying probability bound inM .
The next lemma is a concentration result that holds when no information is revealed by the queries
about any individual column.
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Lemma A.2. Suppose that the event fj(x + ρ) 6= fj(x) is independent and identical for each
column j. Fix a data point (x, y). Given a perturbation ρ which solves the security challenge for the
random ensemble with target probability ε > 0, then for every random classifier in the ensemble, ρ
solves the security challenge for it with failure rate δ < 2(r +
√
log(1/ε)/2M)
Proof. Recall that the adversary is said to have solved the security challenge for the random ensem-
ble if the vector of code bits CZ(x+ ρ) := (f1(x+ ρ), . . . , fM (x+ ρ)) has Hamming distance less
than Mr to any other codeword Zi, where i 6= y. Since each entry of the code matrix is sampled
independently, we can consider the probability of this event bit-by-bit.
Let Etj be the event where fj(x + ρ) = Ztj . Let Et be the probability of the event where ‖CZ(x +
ρ′)−Zt‖1 ≤Mr, meaning the codeword for class t is the closest. By the independence assumption,
we havePr[Et] = Pr[X > M(1− r)] whereX ∼ Binom(M,Pr[Etj ]), or equivalently,
Pr[Et] = Pr
[
X < Mr |X ∼ Binom(M, 1−Pr Etj)
]
. (2)
The probability of changing F (x) from y to any other class can be bounded by applying the union
bound to all t 6= y. We obtain
Pr[FZ(x + ρ) 6= FZ(x)] ≤ (N − 1)Pr[Et],
and by the assumption of the lemma we know the left-hand side probability is δ > 0. Thus we just
need to computePr[Eij ] and apply a tail inequality for the binomial distribution.
Fix one underlying code bit j and some other class t 6= y. Each bit Ztj differs from the corre-
sponding bit of Cyj with probability 1/2 under the random code sampling scheme. Without loss
of generality, we’ll let Zyj = +1. We analyze the probability of the event fj(x + ρ) = Ztj by
conditioning on Ztj , obtaining
Pr
[
Etj
]
= Pr
[
Ztj = −1
]
Pr
[
fj(x + ρ) = −1|Ztj = −1, Zyj = 1
]
+Pr
[
Ztj = +1
]
Pr
[
fj(x+ ρ) = +1|Ztj = +1, Zyj = +1
]
.
We note that the termPr[fj(x+ ρ) = −1|Ztj = −1, Zyj = +1] is exactly the the probability 1− δ
in Definition 2. Then Pr[Etj ] can be bounded by
Pr[Etj ] ≤
1
2
(1− δ) +
1
2
(1) = 1−
δ
2
.
Then the probability in (2) can be bounded by using Hoeffding’s inequality B.2:
Pr[Et ≤Mr] ≤ exp
(
−2M
(
r −
δ
2
)2)
.
Thus we have
log(1/ε) > 2M
(
δ
2
− r
)2
,
which is equivalent to
δ < 2
(
r +
√
log(1/ε)
2M
)
.
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Proof of Theorem 4. We are given an instance of the security challenge for a randombinary classifier
(Definition 2). Let fz be the random binary classifier, where z ∼ {±1}
N is uniformly sampled. We
can simulate the entire random ensemble by constructingM − 1 additional random classifiers in the
same way that fz is sampled, so that f1 = fz and f2, . . . , fM are freshly sampled. Let Z
−j denote
the matrix Z without the jth column, so that FZ−j : X → {1, . . . , N} denotes the output of the
random ensemble ignoring fj .
By the definition of the security challenge, the adversary cannot query f1; however since FZ−1 is
simulated by the adversary, he can make queries to FZ−1 and run A to produce a perturbation ρ
attacking FZ−1 . But if FZ−1(qi) = FZ(qi) for each query qi, thenA would have produced the same
perturbation ρ attacking FZ .
By Lemma A.1 and a union bound over the number of queries, the hypothetical query answers
a1, . . . , aQ to the entire ensemble FZ depend only on FZ−1 with probability at least
1− Pr
Z−1
[
∃i FZ−1(qi) 6= FZ(qi)
]
≥ 1− 4NQ
√
1− r
2πMr
·
(
3
25/3
)M
. (3)
Now in order to apply Lemma A.2 to bound ε as a function of δ, we want to show for each j that
the event fj(x + ρ) 6= fj(x) is independent of the query answers a1, . . . , aQ. This can be done by
applying Lemma A.1 again to each column j to show that with high probability, the query answers
only depend on the random sampling of Z−j . Since ρ = φ({ak}
Q
k=1) is a function of the query
answers, then this means that the adversary’s chosen ρ also only depends on Z−j . We obtain
Pr
Zj
[
fj(x+ ρ) 6= fj(x) | a1, . . . , aQ
]
= Pr
Zj
[
fj(x+ ρ) 6= fj(x) |Z
−j
]
= Pr
Zj
[
fj(x+ ρ) 6= fj(x)
]
,
and we see that this probability has no dependence on the actual column j since Zj is independent
and identical for each j. We incur a factor M in the probability of failure by applying a union
bound of the failure probability in (3) over all j = 1, . . . ,M . Thus the event fj(x + ρ) 6= fj(x) is
independent and identical for each column j with probability at least
1− 4MNQ
√
1− r
2πMr
·
(
3
25/3
)M
.
Then by Lemma A.2, the probability of ρ changing the output of fz is at least
1− 2
(
r +
√
log(1/ε)
2M
)
.
B Probability inequalities
Lemma B.1. Suppose λn is an integer, where 0 < λ < 1. Then(
n
λn
)
≤
1√
2πnλ(1− λ)
2nH2(λ)
where H2(λ) = −λ log2 λ− (1− λ) log2(1− λ) is the negative entropy function.
Lemma B.2. [Hoeffding’s inequality] SupposeX ∼ Binom(n, p). Then for any α > 0,
Pr
[
X ≤ (p− α)n
]
≤ exp
(
−2α2n
)
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C Link to code for experiments
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/l5p242guwhlby8t/AAAJBk1iw4YRHXRZ5nHO_dv-a?dl=0
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